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Transnational employee voice and knowledge exchange in the multinational 
corporation: The European Company (SE) experience 
Abstract 
The European Company (SE) regulations include the highest mandatory provision for 
negotiation of transnational employee voice. What are the effects of transnational employee 
voice, enacted at works council and board levels, on knowledge exchange within the 
multinational corporation? This qualitative study of globally active SEs incorporated under 
the SE regulations that have ‘dual-forum’ transnational employee voice addresses that 
research gap. Our main contribution reveals that, over time, transnational employee voice 
facilitates multifaceted knowledge exchange, both widening the platform and strengthening 
relations for intra-MNC collaboration. Alongside expressing labour interests as intended, 
dual-forum transnational employee voice stimulates managers and employees to develop 
mutually beneficial competencies and trust. These aid multilateral knowledge exchange. That 
knowledge, which includes factors affecting employees and quality of organizational and 
work life, also includes insights into country-specific market, industrial, and operational 
issues. Importantly, dual-forum transnational voice fosters development of a participatory 
culture across the MNC. Robust multifaceted knowledge exchange generates better-informed 
and more productive decision-making that yields plural socio-economic value.  
Keywords: Multinational corporation, MNC, knowledge exchange, knowledge sharing, 
transnational employee voice, trust, European Company, Societas Europaea, European Work 
Council, trade unions 
Introduction 
Transnational employee voice refers to representative employee interest expression in 
multinational companies (MNCs) that is inclusive of, and drawn from, employees across 
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multiple countries where the MNC operates. This subject increasingly attracts research 
attention, principally in regard to protection and advancement of employees’ interests (De 
Spiegelaere and Jagodziński, 2015; Hann et al., 2017; Keller and Werner, 2012). 
Transnational employee voice is at origin an institution intended, according to the Council of 
the European Union, to ‘promote the social objectives of the European Community’ 
(Directive 2001/86). From a labour interest perspective, transnational employee voice is a 
hard-won and often tenuous and fraught accomplishment. A rights and benefits interest is 
therefore, unremarkably, of principal emphasis. But the role of transnational employee voice 
in generating knowledge and capabilities development with potential multilateral and 
multifaceted benefits warrants investigation. 
Many companies emphatically pursue economic and market objectives and regard 
labour interests and demands as a cost to be managed. Many are reluctant to consider the 
wider utility and value of facilitating employee voice and social rights. Yet, at the same time, 
MNCs are highly reliant on skilled workers and efficient transnational, cross-subsidiary 
knowledge flows and exchange. Knowledge exchange is a core shared interest among actors 
in an economic organization. Transnational employee voice provides a formal resource and 
channel of knowledge and interest expression. We propose that the social character of 
employee voice inclines it to various and unpredictable outcomes and generativity. The 
interaction of labour-interested transnational employee voice with management-interested 
operational knowledge exchange may yield socio-economic value. 
A stream of research addressing the employment relations benefits and politics of 
employee voice has pointed to potential or actual mutual benefits of formal employee voice 
practices for both labour and company interests (Boxall and Macky, 2009; Budd et al., 2010; 
Kim et al., 2010; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Lavelle et al., 2010). Some have proposed the 
importance of the ‘soft power’ of employee participation that exerts constraint on firms’ 
market imperatives and ensures the salience of labour interests (Casey et al., 2016). But 
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results are inconclusive and, for labour actors, typically more worrisome than encouraging. 
Decline or manipulation of employee voice practices is a recurrent concern (Baccaro and 
Howell, 2017). 
Nonetheless, in the case of the European Union (EU), formal statutory provisions aim 
to protect the social interests and rights of employees across MNCs’ entities in the EU. 
Notably, provisions for transnational employee involvement (i.e. representative employee 
influence in company decisions), first introduced in the 1990s, entail employee interest 
expression that is scarcely available in the rest of the world. The effectiveness of these 
transnational institutions is still emergent. In contribution to research on that effectiveness, 
we enquire in this article into effects of transnational employee voice in regard to the 
intersection of labour-interested transnational employee voice with management concerns for 
employees to share knowledge that facilitates and enhances organizational and operational 
activity. Our research questions ask: what are the effects of transnational employee voice that 
includes both works councils and transnational employee board-level representation on 
knowledge exchange processes? What do they yield over time?  
We pursue these questions by investigating the provision of transnational employee 
voice in the European Company (Societas Europaea, SE). We focus on the SE because SE 
regulations include the highest mandatory provision for negotiation of transnational employee 
involvement, including transnational board-level employee representation and transnational 
works councils. The SE formally possesses potential to provide relatively extensive forums of 
transnational employee voice. Knowledge about potential multifaceted benefits of relatively 
robust transnational employee voice is scarce. 
Much debate on transnational employee voice arrangements occurring in company 
operations raises concerns in regard to company power to circumvent or weakly adopt 
employee voice practices and deflect trade union demands (Baccaro and Howell, 2017; 
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Keller and Rosenbohm, 2019; Pulignano and Waddington, 2019). We are cognisant of those 
concerns. We also contribute to debates by bringing to light nuances and human relational 
factors that are stimulated among actors within organizations in the course of enacting 
transnational employee voice in MNCs. Alongside employee rights interests it casts light on 
ways – both longitudinal processes and effects – in which transnational employee voice 
builds capacity for multilateral (vertical and horizontal) knowledge sharing across borders 
with diverse utility. The article demonstrates that SE transnational employee voice, when 
effectively enacted at works council and board levels, generates expansive capacity for intra-
MNC collaboration. SE transnational voice stimulates managers and employees to develop 
competencies, including trust, that facilitate multilateral knowledge sharing toward 
development of a shared participatory culture across the MNC. The knowledge shared 
includes insights into country-specific market and industrial issues, factors affecting 
employees and quality of organizational and work life. Importantly, such knowledge 
contributes to company strategic decisions of mutual benefit to management and workers.  
Below, we briefly review the literature on transnational employee voice in European 
MNCs, and knowledge sharing in MNCs. That is followed by the methodology and findings. 
We then discuss our contributions, and limitations, before a brief conclusion. 
Transnational employee voice in European MNCs  
Key developments in formal establishment of transnational employee voice in 
European MNCs arise predominantly from institutionalization of European works councils 
(EWCs). The 1994 European Works Councils Directive, recast in 2009, established the first 
mandatory transnational industrial relations institution applicable to MNCs operating in the 
European Union. That was followed in 2001 by the European Company Statute and Directive 
and the Information and Consultation Directive in 2002. The 2003 Statute for a European 
Cooperative Society and the 2005 Cross-Border Mergers Directive included provisions for 
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employee board-level representation largely based on the SE Directive, but due to longer 
history, availability of rich data, and greater salience, much attention is accorded to EWCs.  
Robust debate on the EWC over 20 years (Hann et al., 2017; Kerckhofs, 2015; Lecher 
et al., 2002; Waddington, 2010; Whittall et al., 2007) concerns its successes, failures and 
challenges. EWCs are widely recognized as important to European social dialogue and 
improve transnational participation, information and consultation. At the same time, 
researchers point to considerable variety in EWC experiences and effectiveness. Many MNCs 
have been slow to set up EWCs. Sometimes contentiousness and stalled negotiations have 
resulted in European-level trade unions taking cases to the European Court of Justice 
(Whittall et al., 2009). Once established some EWCs remain rudimentary with little or no 
substantive influence (Marginson et al., 2013). Others are dominated by particular national 
actors with internal conflicts among representatives and little transnational inclusion 
(Mählmeyer et al., 2017). Some EWCs are effective in achieving transnational employee 
participation with influence in company decisions (Hann et al., 2017; Hertwig et al., 2011; 
Waddington, 2010). More generally, researchers conclude that erratic and disappointing 
development shows EWCs remain a contested institution with many being utilized 
predominantly to employer advantage (Pulignano and Waddington, 2019). 
Managers may utilize EWCs for communicating on strategic issues, legitimizing 
organizational change and circumventing industrial conflict (Lippert et al., 2014). EWCs with 
a stable information structure and productive management relationships gain legitimacy and 
increase knowledge exchange across borders and between subsidiaries and business units 
(Lecher et al., 2002; Waddington, 2010; Whittall et al., 2007). While these may favour 
management interests, researchers note that continual networking within EWCs of union 
officials and transnational employee representatives contributes to trust building and 
knowledge sharing among diverse actors (Marginson et al., 2004; Platzer and Rüb, 2014). 
That encourages actors to transcend national interests and foster wider cooperation (Cavallini 
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et al., 2015). These findings point to wider and potentially mutual benefits to employees and 
company actors of effective voice practices. 
In regard to the SE, the Directive (2001/86/EC) requires that employers negotiate 
arrangements for formal employee involvement. This must occur on establishment and there 
is no minimum employment threshold. The required arrangements include forming an SE 
European Works Council (hereafter SEWC) with, at minimum, information and consultation 
rights, and negotiation of transnational employee representation at board level. SEWCs 
operate similarly to EWCs (De Spiegelaere and Jagodziński, 2015). Most SEs are German 
establishments and they have to date typically retained their pre-SE incorporation employee 
voice practices according to German regulation (Rosenbohm, 2013; Weiß, 2016). Most 
SEWCs officially can ‘give opinion/comment’, ‘initiate projects’, ‘make recommendations’, 
engage in ‘negotiations’ and aim to ‘reach consensus’ and possess greater competencies on 
employment issues of redundancies, job transfers and skill development systems (De 
Spiegelaere and Jagodziński, 2015). Relatively few SEs have agreed transnational board-level 
employee representation (Cremers et al., 2013) but where established, the SEWC typically 
exceeds information and consultation rights. Where SEWCs elect transnational board-level 
employee representation a direct link is forged that aids coordination (Waddington and 
Conchon, 2017). 
The influence of transnational board-level employee representation on company 
decisions ranges from very little (Carley, 2005) to variable (Gold, 2011) and sometimes 
significant (Waddington and Conchon, 2017). Some research indicates that input from 
transnational board-level employee representatives (TBLERs) into board discussions can 
mitigate internal agency problems (Fauver and Fuerst, 2006) and enhance knowledge flows 
across subsidiaries (Casey et al., 2016; Gold, 2011). Waddington and Conchon (2017) 
observe SE employee board-level representation as developing some unique patterns beyond 
7 
 
merely extending national practices and features. This suggests that the relationships between 
transnational employees, union experts and managers evolve over time. But how they evolve, 
and how they achieve compatibility and mutual benefits, is unclear. We return to this point 
below; first, brief remarks on knowledge exchange in the MNC are pertinent. 
Knowledge exchange in MNCs 
A field of research in international business and management addresses the transfer, 
flow and optimal utilization of organizational and operational knowledge across 
geographically and culturally dispersed units of MNCs. Attention frequently focuses on 
relations between headquarters and subsidiaries and among subsidiaries (Ahlvik and 
Björkman, 2015). Researchers identify barriers and frictions in transnational knowledge 
transfer that include institutional divergence on many dimensions and at multiple levels, from 
national macroeconomic and business systems to interpersonal behavioural norms. 
Miscommunications and misunderstandings arise from diverse languages and cultures 
(Bhagat et al., 2002; Harzing and Pudelki, 2013; Welch and Welch, 2008) and frictions arise 
from divergent management practices and ideologies (Hughes et al., 2017; Mudambi and 
Swift, 2011; Tempel et al., 2006), and political processes (Ferner et al., 2012; Morgan and 
Kristensen, 2006) both within the MNC and between national business systems (Edwards et 
al., 2013). A stream of research addresses the role of HRM practices and capabilities 
development (Ahlvik and Björkman, 2015; Belizón, 2018; Edwards and Edwards, 2015; 
Minbaeva et al., 2003) that affect MNC organizational and operational effectiveness.  
Across these concerns, researchers identify the role of trust, including employee–
manager relationships, in facilitating information and knowledge exchange (Lee et al., 2010; 
Nahapiet and Goshal, 1998; Wang and Noe, 2010). Mistrust hinders transnational 
communication, collaboration and knowledge sharing (Geppert and Williams, 2006). Trust 
includes affective and cognitive dimensions (Adler, 2001; McAllister, 1995) that dynamically 
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co-exist. Affective trust occurs on a personal level built through social interactions and based 
on emotional factors (Chua et al., 2008). Cognitive trust concerns appraisal of past 
performance and professional knowledge of another (Chowdhury, 2005). Affective trust 
comes to the fore in facilitating interpersonal knowledge sharing, while cognitive trust among 
actors enhances the organizational learning environment (Martin-Perez and Martin-Cruz, 
2015; Swift and Hwang, 2013). Questions on how that trust is generated remain puzzling. 
In regard to transnational knowledge exchange, researchers observe the role of  
skilful individuals in navigating intracompany tensions and barriers. Individuals use personal, 
linguistic, communication, cultural and other relational skills to aid information exchange, 
resolve conflicts and build trust (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2014; Harzing and Pudelki, 2013). 
They form and strengthen networks, help organizational units cooperate (Grigoriou and 
Rothaermel, 2014) and coordinate goals between managers and employees (Schotter and 
Beamish, 2011). Motivation to share knowledge is affected by the quality of organizational 
culture, inter-actor trust, and employee well-being (Geppert and Williams, 2006; Minbaeva et 
al., 2003; Peltokorpi, 2015). Seldom studied, however, is the role of formal transnational 
employee voice, which is primarily instituted to protect employee rights and interests, in 
affecting various intra-MNC knowledge exchange.  
Following our review of the transnational voice and knowledge exchange literature, 
we propose that close attention to the inter-relations of employee voice practices with 
processes of operational knowledge exchange among company personnel may bring to light 
qualitative factors and dynamics of exchange. In organizational working life, employees, in 
possession of occupational skills, competencies and pride, possess two-fold interests: those of 
protection of their employee rights, and those of mutually valued contribution of their 
expertise (Casey, 2009). That is, workers typically want to contribute their occupational and 
human resources to productive goals valued by the company, and secure employee esteem 
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and rights at the same time. Effective and respected transnational employee voice practices 
propose to enhance the latter and may simultaneously facilitate and enhance productive 
knowledge flows. 
Methodology  
To investigate the effects on intra-MNC knowledge exchange of transnational 
employee voice that combines works councils with transnational board-level employee 
representation, we conducted an empirical study of 13 SEs in operation in 2014. All of the 
SEs are headquartered in Germany except for one headquartered in Austria. At mid-2014, 
there were 2150 SEs in 25 of the 30 European Economic Area states, but most were irregular 
registrations (Stollt and Kluge, 2011). We selected cases using three criteria. First, we studied 
exclusively ‘normal’ SEs: those actually operating and employing people. Second, we 
focussed on SEs that have established not only SE works councils (which are mandatory) but 
also transnational board-level employee representation (which is subject to negotiation). 
These remain a rare phenomenon, with by mid-2018 only 73 existing SEs having agreed 
employee board representation (Keller and Rosenbohm, 2019). Third, we focussed on large 
companies, namely those with more than 3000 employees, as we expected these to face the 
greatest challenge in transforming well-established national employee voice into 
transnational employee voice. Using the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) database and 
our own research on company documentation, we identified 21 large, normal, dual-forum 
SEs. Of these, 13 agreed to participate in our research.  
We conducted 45 in-depth interviews. Interviewees worked in Germany, Italy, 
Austria, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. They comprised CEOs and senior 
managers, TBLERs, SE works council members, trade union officials and expert informants. 
The latter two groups were invited as they typically perform an important role in establishing 
the SE and continual advice of employee representatives. We conducted the interviews (35–
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75 minutes) in person or by telephone in the participant’s preferred language. Interviews 
enquired about participants’ role, involvement in and experience with transnational employee 
voice, including SE works council and board-level representation, and the aims they 
perceived each company had in adopting the SE form. We asked about objectives, outcomes, 
interactions between managers and TBLERs, and barriers to and facilitators of collaboration. 
The semi-structured interview protocol was adjusted for participants’ different roles 
(Creswell, 2012). The interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
For 12 of the 13 companies at least one management and one employee 
representative, and at least one board member, were included. Industries spanned automotive, 
manufacturing, insurance, electric utility, market research, construction, retail, chemicals and 
medical care. By sampling multiple perspectives, the potential informant bias can be reduced 
(Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010), enhancing the credibility of the findings (Langley and 
Abdallah, 2011). Table 1 profiles the SEs and the interviewees’ positions. As the data in the 
table demonstrates, these MNCs have significant global reach and influence with at least 40% 
of their employees are outside their home country. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We analysed and coded the interviews, identifying patterns, similarities and 
differences. Although we collected all the interview data in a single period of eight months, 
we analysed it longitudinally, yielding our three-phase findings. To understand how 
transnational employee voice evolved over time, we enquired into the sequence of events for 
each SE; how relationships between different key actors changed over time and how it 
affected knowledge sharing. Respondents reported their perceptions on key themes, such as 
mechanisms to establish transnational employee voice, challenges and perceived outcomes. 
We returned to transcripts iteratively (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) to reach saturation in 
coding (Urquhart, 2013). First, ‘open coding’ captured themes from interviews about how the 
establishment of the SE affected employee voice in the MNC (first-order categories) (Corbin 
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and Strauss, 2008). The emerging themes were constantly compared and contrasted to 
identify broader, second-order themes (Gioia et al., 2013). Table 2 illustrates themes selected 
from all phases with quotations from three perspectives: employees, unions and managers. It 
shows barriers, change mechanisms to overcome them and outcomes. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Second, ‘axial coding’ brought out patterns of interactions and relationships between 
the categories (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Finally, ‘selective coding’ discerned core themes 
and their relationships including temporal patterns in how the SE was implemented. To 
discover mechanisms underlying knowledge sharing, we compared and contrasted our 
evolving findings with the literature. We studied company documents and extant SE case 
studies to triangulate the qualitative interviews and obtain a more fine-grained understanding 
of the research context. Based on this analysis, we derived a process model that describes the 
typical process of raising transnational employee voice in SEs through three phases and their 
effects on knowledge sharing.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE  
Findings 
Taking a processual and longitudinal approach, our analysis of the data discerned 
three phases that depict the evolution of relationships between transnational employees, union 
actors and management actors over time: 1) pre-SE and anticipations of the SE; 2) the 
establishment and working of the SEWC; and 3) the SEWC’s articulated relations with the 
board. Phases 2 and 3 thus overlap. Figure 1 traces these phases at three levels: national, 
SEWC and board.  
Phase 1: Employee voice and SE initiation 
Prior to establishment of the SEWC employee voice was notably unevenly distributed 
and practiced across the MNCs. Only employees from headquarters were represented on the 
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board. Despite headquarters’ long history of transnational board-level employee 
representation, some subsidiaries had no national works council and/or access to a 
transnational one. Therefore, transnational employees often had few or no linkages and their 
representatives had never met before SEWC negotiations. A manager explained: ‘We had an 
EWC before the SEWC. It was not fully involved in cross-border projects’ (#2- HR Director). 
Transnational employees had very little voice and opportunity to exchange knowledge. Pre-
SE works council, the variations between different national employee voice provisions 
obstructed transnational employee voice development. For instance, respondents reported that 
subsidiaries often had a mainly adversarial voice culture whereas headquarters displayed a 
more collaborative culture.  
Employee representatives entered SEWC negotiations with trepidation. A union 
lawyer noted: ‘some representatives from smaller countries ... don’t know what employee 
voice means, what opportunities it can create, what rights they have, and how it relates to the 
company’ (#42- Trade union lawyer). Others feared the SEWC would take subsidiaries’ 
autonomy or headquarter representatives would dominate negotiations. Some worried that 
converting to an SE might undermine relations with management. A union representative 
observed: 
There are very different types of employee voice in Europe and different processes of 
selecting employee representatives. There are very different people coming together 
who, from a German perspective, are not necessarily suitable representatives. Trust in 
the [negotiating] committee can be weak. (#29- Trade union, board) 
Moreover, the prospect of board participation makes the SE framework more 
contestable. Many SEWCs elect TBLERs who share their knowledge and perspectives with 
managers. Following transnationalization, employees from headquarters had to surrender 
some seats to transnational colleagues who lacked board-level experience. Some shared a 
union expert’s ‘concern that transnationalization could weaken employee voice on the 
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board… A reliable, agreed representation will become more difficult’ (#44- EU trade union 
official). Transnational employees noted the duties and torn loyalties board membership 
would entail. A lawyer explained that in some EU member states:  
There are strong reservations against [transnational board-level employee 
representation] because it means representatives may be involved in unpopular 
decisions. It is unthinkable for a French or Spanish colleague to be part of a decision 
to close down a business unit. [So] they don’t want to be part of the board. (#42- 
Trade union lawyer) 
Yet, many managers acknowledged that the pre-SE voice structure, dominated by 
headquarters employees, did not reflect the reality of the MNC and impeded knowledge 
sharing. One executive manager explained:  
Our European market share has been strong for some years, so we were already a 
European company. A single country dominating this European company [in] 
employee voice no longer reflected our structure. (#6- CEO/Chair of board) 
 
Phase 2: SE works council and transnational knowledge sharing 
Negotiations with employer and employee representatives aim to produce a firm-
specific agreement on transnational employee voice including capacities of the SEWC and 
board representation. Our data identifies the significance of key actors in enacting agreed 
arrangements and facilitating knowledge sharing. Three aspects were significant: 1) key 
individuals forging personal (affective) trust during negotiations; 2) skilled individuals’ 
guidance and experience on augmenting effective employee voice practices in subsidiaries to 
achieve transnational compatibility; and 3) joint actors hailing early successes of the SEWC 
to build legitimacy.  
Firstly, a manager reported that negotiations in his company were marred by tensions 
among different Polish trade unions. An individual Polish employee deliberately worked to 
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win trust and build unity on the negotiating committee. Through interpersonal interactions 
and emphasizing shared interests, disparate views shifted toward sufficient consensus for 
decisions to be made. In another example, an executive manager who had assisted on other 
SE transformations as a lawyer was strategically hired as HR Director to support the MNC’s 
transformation. His interventions included promoting informal gatherings, like shared dinners 
and city tours, which cultivated vital personal affective trust among representatives. The 
importance of key individuals during initial negotiations in building employee–manager 
relations further emerged from an executive manager and an HR Director of separate SEs, 
who each praised their SEWC chairs: 
[He] is well connected and well respected by the senior management team. As a 
result, if the SEWC makes a request we usually comply [...]. (#2- HR Director)  
The [SE] works council chair was very charismatic and had good access to the 
different international representatives. He was well respected and a good moderator. 
Without him, the establishment would have been very difficult. (#41- Executive legal) 
On the second factor, the guiding action of skilled individuals enabled identification 
and harnessing of actors’ experience and knowledge of employee voice at national or local 
levels to highlight effective practices and processes for sharing across different countries. 
They also identified where direct transfer between countries with divergent practices was 
inappropriate or counterproductive. Skilled and experienced employee representatives, unions 
and managers pooled ideas and experiences. Their initiatives included: 
We’ve now established country meetings in the subsidiaries. Before and after SEWC 
meetings, employee representatives meet with national works council and HR 
managers, exchange knowledge about various issues and discuss how change projects 
can be implemented in the specific country. (#12- Employee representative) 
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Union representatives with access to specific knowledge on the legal provisions of other 
SEWCs presented this knowledge to employee representatives at workshops or SEWC 
meetings. For instance, they explained ‘what we [employees] have to do, the different 
national legal systems and so on’ (#17- Trade union, board). By considering ‘the different 
national systems they found a compromise agreed by all countries using the experience of the 
representatives in negotiations’ (#12- Employee representative, SEWC). Such knowledge 
exchange exposed employees with particular experience to more expansive potential in 
exercizing voice: 
During SE works council meetings, people listen and are surprised about the level of 
influence works councils have in Germany or in Austria. They want to know how this 
can be achieved. (#17- Trade union, board) 
We have an opportunity to get a new perspective. For example, we have a colleague 
from Poland who offers a different view, and this opened our minds to take a wider 
perspective and consider the roles other countries play. (#40- SEWC, board) 
The third role of key actors entailed communicating early achievements of the SEWC. 
That helped legitimize and encourage transnational employee voice in subsidiaries. Examples 
included SEWCs preventing redundancies or negotiating benefits readily recognized by 
employee representatives. Success stories also inspired trust to further engage and share 
knowledge. Significantly, such stories often went beyond the constituencies of the SEWC, 
whose legal obligations only included cross-national issues. In several MNCs the SEWC 
secured labour-interested benefits in individual countries with national subsidiaries. 
Examples included a national works council, company-provided childcare, education and 
training, and support in a crisis. One SEWC representative reported: ‘In Greece, we had a 
crisis, and the SEWC was trusted with discussing it…’ and so, ‘even though the revenue had 
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halved, no redundancies were made. So we are not just focussing on cross-border issues, we 
also look at specific country cases’ (#35- SEWC).  
Furthermore, when SEWCs relay knowledge to national works councils, national 
employees gain additional valuable information from management ‘which they could have 
never obtained’ (#1- SEWC, board). For instance, an employee 
[…] at plant level does not realize how much knowledge is shared on the SEWC. But 
of course, he notices positive change in his [subsidiary] company. The national works 
council can gain benefits through the effects of the SEWC (#22- HR Director). 
Overall, through augmenting employee practices to improve transnational 
compatibility, fostering inter-personal trust, sharing stories of favourable outcomes, solidarity 
and camaraderie, key actors’ collective trust in the SEWC had been built. That in turn 
facilitated further knowledge sharing and collaboration. Over time, new routines and 
structures were created that fostered favourable transnational relations.  
Trust is becoming stronger… Everybody now knows the basic facts, the issues … 
There is some routine now that helps to find a shared position much faster. Through 
this routine they gain more strength. (#23- Trade union, board) 
A CEO reports what he deems the benefits of a ‘shared participatory culture of 
employee voice’ (#6- CEO/Chairman of board) that go beyond employee interest and 
improve manager–employee relationships. In sharing knowledge and concerns they recognize 
shared interests.  
Importantly, actors report transnational employee voice also enhances operational 
knowledge flows and trust in the MNC. For instance, an SEWC representative illustrated the 
intermingling of knowledge and interests in knowledge transfer. His SEWC reports and 
shares knowledge ‘about current technical issues… We have a priority email to communicate 
urgent incidents, such as machine failures. We ask across the MNC [for expert advice] to fix 
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it’ (#35- SEWC). Respondents noted that highly skilled employees like to share their 
knowledge with similar others across the company group. This suggests employee interests 
are multifaceted and interwoven. 
A further point refers to an MNCs’ cultural diversity which extant literature has noted 
as historically a source of misunderstanding, distrust, conflict and barriers to knowledge 
sharing. Actors report that SEWCs and TBLERs enable more congenial inclusion and 
positive recognition of cultural diversity. It becomes a source of high performance, fostering 
organizational learning and motivation. Transnational personnel ‘learn from each other and 
take things that are working well back home’ (#41- Executive manager – legal). A board 
chair reports: 
In many ways, it’s about psychological and cultural change. Employees can say, we 
belong together … as a result, the motivation, organizational integration and solidarity 
can be strengthened. (#13- CEO/Chairman of board)  
Managers reported that the SEWCs influenced organizational change and 
restructuring in MNCs, like relocations, operational expansions and socially responsible 
redundancies. A manager reports that their ‘SEWC is involved in capital investment 
planning’ (#22- HR Director). Another respondent reported a subsidiary company facing a 
severe financial crisis. A plan by the SEWC, with managers, ‘to help highly qualified 
workers shift jobs across countries (#11- SEWC, board) ensured highly skilled employees 
were retained within the company’. 
The SEWC achieves mutual recognition of these bundles of interests and fosters a 
collective social response to problems such as jobs and skills retention. 
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Phase 3: Transnational employee voice, knowledge sharing and board relationships 
In the third phase the board representatives and the SEWC forged stronger links, 
ensuring knowledge from the board was shared with the SEWC within its legal boundaries. 
In our cases TBLERs also sat on the SEWC. Respondents said two main factors increased 
effective board representation: TBLERs building cognitive trust with managers; and gaining 
competencies to effectively straddle their sometimes conflicting roles or loyalties. Cognitive 
trust is won, for instance, as TBLERs develop skills in accounting and company law, ‘to read 
financial statements presented according IFAS accounting standards’ (#43- European trade 
union expert). Company and union respondents note that where industries require board 
members to gain certified competencies companies paid for the training. Mutual benefits are 
expected. Meanwhile, at SEWC level European unions provide training, including 
disseminating privileged knowledge and expertise gained through their transnational 
networks: ‘They share this knowledge between EWCs in the same industry as well as 
different industries’ (#18- Trade union actor).  
Transnational labour-interested knowledge enables TBLERs to influence companies’ 
decision-making on restructuring projects. But the weight of that influence, actors report, 
depended on managers’ trust of TBLERs. To strengthen influence between the SEWC and 
managers, employee representatives must nurture a constructive relationship with managers. 
One executive manager, who directed human resources, said: 
[Employee representatives] can consult on major strategic decisions, but from a legal 
point of view they have no ‘hard’ participation rights [to approve decisions]. It is 
important that they gain the trust of the executive team. (#2- HR Director)  
Importantly, the trust accorded TBLERs enables them to influence employee and social 
issues. Trust with managers takes more than good personal relationships. According to 
executives, employee representatives’ input must add value to board decision-making and be 
constructive and fair, while representing their constituency. TBLERs must ask hard questions 
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that challenge managers’ current thinking. One CEO uses the term ‘sparring partner’ to 
describe the ideal board-level employee representative; ‘they need to provide critical but 
constructive input’ (#13- CEO/ Chairman). If employee representatives can win managers’ 
trust, the SEWC’s influence may surpass legal obligations. For example, an HR director 
reports that the company needed to undertake ‘a very large restructuring project of a 
subsidiary due to new regulations. It did not directly affect employees, but we involved them. 
We involved the SEWC on changing the business model of the subsidiary’ (#2- HR 
Director). In such actions managers also foster more trust among labour actors. 
The second factor influencing how effective TBLERs were on the board was how 
well they learned to straddle their dual (or multiple) roles and loyalties: to their SEWC 
electors, their transnational constituency, national subsidiary workforce peers, and managers 
as fellow board members. The SEWC has to be strategic about board appointments: 
We have a very sophisticated system to ensure that each region is represented, 
including the headquarter and its subsidiaries. We select the six seats based on the 
consideration that each region somehow has access to the board. We don’t elect 
representatives on whether we like them but based on how they can represent a 
region. (#44- EU trade union official) 
I suggested that it wouldn’t be wise if one country has more than half the seats…. The 
employee representatives from the headquarter country then agreed to limit their own 
positions to less than half. (#35- SEWC) 
To be effective on the board, TBLERs had to ‘learn how to wear different hats’ (#44- EU 
trade union official), making difficult decisions and keeping some information confidential 
while also connecting the SEWC to the board. Legal training was considered helpful to 
understand ‘what is allowed or not allowed’, but it also posed a personal and interpersonal 
challenge. For example, TBLERs sometimes reported pressures from the national works 
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council to disclose board information without the required management approval. Moreover, 
TBLERs said the local management ‘do not want to allow much time for their workers to be 
in these kinds of [transnational] bodies’ (#35- SEWC). Experienced transnational actors 
endeavour to assist with these role conflicts and tensions: 
I am now helping one of my colleagues from Belgium who is involved in a conflict. 
In Belgium, it’s normal to report back all information to colleagues on the council. 
But of course, you cannot simply report back what is happening on the board. (#39- 
Trade union lawyer representative) 
Once established, TBLERs became an effective channel for multilateral knowledge 
sharing. Through their links to SEWCs, they disseminate managerial knowledge and 
employee insights to and from subsidiaries and headquarter. Executive managers stressed that 
internationalizing the board gave it a global perspective. An executive manager of a German-
registered SE reported that a Polish transnational board-level employee representative 
ensured that: 
[…] see Poland as a cheap production location but as a potential market that requires 
specific products and market intelligence. This has prompted us to discuss how we 
can better structure our production network within Europe. (#22- HR Director)  
Furthermore, TBLERs brought to headquarters knowledge from subsidiaries that local 
management might be unwilling to share. The latter ‘may say that in a certain country 
everything is going really, really well, while employee representatives may tell us that things 
are not going well’ (#22- HR Director).  
Overall, the link between the SEWC and TBLERs afforded specific advantages for 
knowledge sharing. One executive manager described his firm’s election process for TBLERs 
through the SEWC as extremely complex ‘but worth doing’ (#27- HR Director). Now with 
the SEWC, the respondent stated, strong transnational connection has been forged, which the 
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former EWC had not achieved. That was vital for the company because ‘[t]he employees and 
their support play the critical role in our success. In the past it was our assets but today it is 
the knowledge of employees’ (#27- HR Director). 
Discussion  
 
MNC research debates include attention to transnational employee voice and 
industrial relations, and to questions of organizational knowledge transfer and optimal 
utilization across borders. These can entail divergent and conflicting interests among parties. 
Addressing our research questions, we show that transnational employee voice with works 
councils and board-level representation, while principally instituted to protect employee 
interests, can provide avenues for multilateral, multifaceted knowledge exchange in MNCs. 
The effects of dual-forum transnational employee voice and knowledge sharing actors are 
multiple and yield a bundle of organizational resources for actor and organizational utility. 
Our study proposes these effects emerge over time, as transnational employee voice practices 
in the SE mature, and our Findings section has schematized them as three phases. Specifically 
the effects are salience for labour interests, building up of competencies among representative 
actors, better relationships and smoother organization and operations. These occur 
transnationally and yield intra-company cultural and process qualities, as well as social, 
labour-interest value. The data shows resulting cross-party recognition of, and joint response 
to, valuable knowledge, which includes industrial issues at subsidiary level, issues affecting 
employee welfare and quality of organizational and work life, and insights into country-
specific markets. 
Extant studies have shown that building trust and shared identity among transnational 
labour actors through transnational employee voice strengthens employee voice effectiveness 
(Cavallini et al., 2015; Lecher et al., 2002; Whittall et al., 2007). Management relations are 
also identified as vital to sustained trust and cooperation between managers and employees 
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and for effective EWC functioning (Mählmeyer et al., 2017; Whittall et al., 2007). Our study 
concurs. In particular, the data shows that key labour actors play a critical role in building 
trust among TBLERs and promoting effective practices and processes of employee voice at 
national subsidiary levels. It also shows their development of affective and cognitive trust 
among management and fellow employee actors. Their building trust and closer relationships 
at transnational levels facilitate shared interpretation of problems and mutual interest 
recognition. As others have found, relationships are crucial but prone to break down in times 
of crisis (Mählmeyer et al., 2017) or in times of personnel turnover and inexperience of new 
actors (Hann et al., 2017; Kerckhofs, 2015). Moreover, some managers are reluctant to build 
relationships with EWCs (Hann et al., 2017), evasive of transnational inclusion and inclined 
to play national workforces off against each other (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2016). However, 
our study importantly suggests that the dual roles of SEWCs and TBLERs foster building and 
sustaining mutual trust and cooperation between SE managers and employees. 
Active linkages between the SEWC and boards build relationships and maintain 
salience of labour and social issues. Both labour and company actors in this study report that 
sustained relationships of trusted labour actors with management actors affect board-level 
interactions and influence on decisions. Even as much emphasis in the literature, and in our 
study, is placed on labour actors gaining competencies for effective participation in 
transnational employee voice forums, company actors, including managers and executives, 
also gain knowledge and competencies in regard to employee voice and the value of joint 
decisions on some issues. Similarly, emphasis is frequently placed on the role of key actors. 
Yet such individuals may be ‘rare and difficult to imitate’ (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2014), 
posing risk to sustainable voice arrangements if relied on independent of formal voice 
structures. 
Our data indicates that formal transnational employee voice, over time, can diminish 
reliance on key individual actors. While key actors are likely to remain significant, 
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institutionalizing transnational employee voice encourages its normalization and routine 
recourse in interest expression and decision making. Formal and dual forums of transnational 
employee voice, when well linked, create organizational pressures – both structural and social 
– for sharing power and sustaining effort for a culture of cooperation. Effective SEWCs and 
TBLERs enable highly developed multilateral transnational communication and knowledge 
exchange across the MNC’s workforce. They diffuse multifaceted knowledge across 
subsidiaries and to and from headquarters. People in sustained communication readily mix 
productive and relational knowledge sharing in the course of problem solving (Hackman, 
2011) and more efficient implementation of organizational operations. Sustained 
transnational employee voice, our data indicates, builds relationships and social exchange for 
plural socio-economic benefit. 
This study further demonstrates that the role of trade union actors in articulating the 
linkages and relationships is significant (Pulignano, 2017; Telljohann et al., 2009). Effective 
boards typically require directors to utilize highly developed technical competencies and 
industry and international markets knowledge (Kor and Misangyi, 2008; Kroll et al., 2008). 
Our study shows that beyond those expected competencies, experienced trade union 
representatives with intensive transnational labour-interest expertise add highly relevant 
social knowledge to board decision-making. That social knowledge has contributed to 
addressing employee welfare concerns, avoiding redundancies, redeploying workers, and 
participating in business model and operational decisions. Föhrer and Erne (2017) have noted 
in regard to EWCs that unions’ training programmes have resulted in limited impact due to a 
typically narrow pedagogical focus and role conflict of EWC members. However, our 
findings of high-level competencies evident among experienced TBLERs, elected by 
SEWCs, in deploying their legal, cultural, and social knowledge of multiple MNCs and 
accommodating their ‘many hats’ suggest extensive non-formal learning and networking 
occurs. This further suggests much scope for strengthening knowledge transfer forums among 
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works council actors. Respondents in this study reported evidence of their technical and 
financial knowledge contributing to SEWC members and workplace labour actors. They also 
indicated their relationship building efforts to enable greater utilization of transnational 
employee voice provisions, straddle different roles and foster a shared participatory culture. 
All companies in our study had key actors with expertise in national employee voice, 
and often transnational employee voice through EWCs. They reported sharing their 
knowledge and expertise with transnational colleagues, many of whom are EWC members 
but unfamiliar with board-level representation as well as transnational board-level 
representation. It appears that the SE labour actors, with prior familiarity with board 
representation in the German context, played significant roles in transnational board-level 
employee representation initiation and realization. Their expertise is disseminated personally 
and through European trade unions. This point invites further reflection. 
A distinct limitation in this study of SEs must be noted. The SEs of this study, 
predominantly headquartered in Germany, operate in a specific context characterized by 
strong national traditions of employee voice. These have influenced the companies’ 
utilization of transnational employee voice and raise important questions regarding the 
transferability of SE transnational employee voice to other MNCs operating in different 
contexts. While EWCs occur across all EU member states, and board-level employee 
representation occurs in 16 EU member states and Norway (Waddington and Conchon, 
2016), transnational board representation is rare. Its occurrence is concentrated in SEs. 
Therefore, we acknowledge that the SE entails a degree of ‘specialness’, in which both its 
regulatory framework and frequent historical origins in German employee voice institutions 
accrue advantages. Numerous studies of MNCs report management under-utilization of voice 
structures, withholding of information and obstruction (Pulignano and Waddington, 2019; 
Whittall et al., 2008). Yet our data, reporting predominantly favourable, pro-employee 
involvement and participation – including transnational composition of boards – and shared 
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interest recognition from managers as well as labour actors, runs against the tide. 
Significantly, firm actors reported an element of satisfaction in undertaking SE incorporation 
with dual-forum transnational employee voice. Nonetheless, the low uptake overall in SEs of 
board-level employee representation requires caution in regard to transferability of our SE 
findings. 
While the SE with dual-forum transnational employee voice remains rare, all of the 
MNCs in our study are global actors, with significant percentages of employees outside the 
home country or beyond the EU entirely, as Table 1 profiles. That heft strengthens 
implications for other MNCs. Even with historical legacies of German institutions, their 
transnational employee involvement and participation practices indicate that they are not a 
‘mere international extension of the German codetermination’ as Waddington and Conchon’s 
(2017) close study demonstrates, but an institutional innovation of extensive transnational 
reach. The character of that innovation entails both expansion of transnational employee 
voice and capacity development of multifaceted knowledge exchange within the EU. The 
particular qualities of dual-forum transnational employee voice in decision-making bodies 
lend themselves to multilevel attention to both employee rights and business operational 
interests. The apparently typically cooperative relations within and between SEWCs and 
boards, as reported in this study, appear to arise as actors learn elements of cognitive and 
affective trust over time, and learn the arts of cultural inclusion beyond the headquarter 
country. These learnings may enable future dispersion beyond the EU of cooperative yet 
‘sparring partner’ relations of mutual recognition as suggested in our study. Assuming uptake 
of SE incorporation continues, the SE experience may have more transferable learning for 
other European MNCs as an exemplar of transnational employee voice.  
We have to date no data to show effects of transnational employee voice on ‘hard’ 
performance measures but clear evidence for its role in organizational social and cultural 
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infrastructure crafted over time. Future studies could try to tease out and measure 
transnational employee voice’s effect on MNCs’ transnational productivity over time. 
 
Conclusion  
This study of large European MNCs incorporated under the SE regulations and more 
or less implementing those provisions for extensive transnational employee voice on SEWCs 
and company boards demonstrates that multiple parties can benefit from co-participation. The 
article demonstrates that establishing formal transnational employee voice at both works 
council and board levels in the SE both widens the platform, and strengthens relationships for 
intra-MNC collaboration. It offers an advance to debates on knowledge sharing that have 
frequently focussed, in separate forums, on managerial interests in productive capabilities, 
and on labour interests in protecting employee rights and interests. Multifaceted knowledge 
sharing brings multiple – social and economic – principles of organizational flourishing into 
view and pursuit.  
The study demonstrates that provision of formal transnational employee voice 
arrangements builds capacity in the MNC to develop high level competencies including trust 
among transnational employees and managers. That facilitates multifaceted and multilateral 
knowledge exchange. The study also shows that while key actors and relationships are 
significant, so too is the normalization and familiarization of transnational employee voice 
structures that ensure sustained salience of employee interests and efforts of joint problem 
addressing.  
The European Company (SE) offers a window on how the European Union’s most 
extensive legal provision for employee voice may serve to mutual benefit across company 
personnel and organizational operations with wide transnational reach. A final word of 
caution must be recorded. The SE’s transnational employee voice provisions are principally, 
27 
 
and necessarily, instituted for labour’s social interest objectives. While the socio-political 
interactions of transnational employee voice are utilized by diverse transnational actors to 
learn to share, generate and disperse multifaceted knowledge of value to labour and company 
interests, enduring responsibility falls to firm and management actors to ensure the integrity 
of transnational employee voice and avoidance of managerial risk of exploitation of the 
socially generated flows of rich and diverse knowledge. 
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Table 1: Overview of SEs and interviewees  
SE Number 
employees 
(total) 
% Employees⸆  Turn-
over in 
Euro 
Management 
perspective – 
Interviews 
Employee perspective – 
Interviews Home 
country 
Within 
EU (excl. 
home 
country) 
Outside 
EU 
1 >100,000 30 40 30 >50 
billion 
#2 HR Director #3 Trade union, board 
#4 Company 
lawyer 
#1 SEWC, board 
#6 
CEO/Chairman* 
2 >100,000 50 10 40 20–50 
billion 
#6 Supervisory 
board* 
#7 SEWC, board 
#9 Company 
lawyer 
#8 Trade union, board 
3  >100,000 40 10 50 >50 
billion 
#5 HR Director #11 SEWC, board 
#45 Executive – 
legal 
#12 SEWC 
#10 Trade union, board 
4  3,000– 
10,000 
50 20 30 <1 
billion 
#13 
CEO/Chairman  
 
5 50,000–
100,000 
10 70 20 10–20 
billion 
#14 Executive – 
international 
#15 Trade union, board 
#16 Consultant 
6 10,000–
50,000  
30 60 10 1–5 
billion 
#18 HR Director #17 Trade union, board 
#19 Executive – 
legal 
7 50,000–
100,000 
60 30 10 10–20 
billion 
#22 HR Director #20 SEWC 
#23 Company 
lawyer 
#21 Trade union, board 
8 50,000–
100,000 
20 40 40 1–5 
billion 
#24 Executive 
legal 
#25 SEWC 
#26 SEWC 
9 10,000–
50,000  
40 40 20 20–50 
billion 
#27 HR Director  #28 Trade union, board 
#29 Trade union, board 
10 3,000– 
10,000 
30 40 30 1–5 
billion 
#31 HR Director #30 SEWC 
#32 SEWC, board 
11 3,000– 
10,000 
40 60 - 1–5 
billion 
#34 Company 
lawyer 
#33 SEWC, board 
12 3,000– 
10,000 
30 30 40 1–5 
billion 
#36 HR Director #35 SEWC 
#37 SEWC 
#38 SEWC 
13 10,000–
50,000 
50 40 10 1–5 
billion 
#41 Executive 
legal 
#39 Trade union, board 
#40 SEWC, board 
 
 
 
 
 
 
⸆ The percentages have been rounded to the nearest tenth (based on 2015 data).   
* same interview 
Expert interviews 
#42 Trade union lawyer 
#44 EU trade union 
official 
#43 EU trade union 
expert 
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• Sharing experience  
• Giving up seats 
      
  
       
 
    
 
• Building cognitive trust with 
managers 
• Unions especially coach 
TEBLRs to straddle roles  
• TEBLRs straddle roles 
• TEBLRs give strategy 
input 
• Key individuals build 
affective trust in 
negotiations 
• Augmenting effective 
practices for subsidiaries  
• Recording  successes 
 
Figure 1: Raising transnational employee voice through SE phases and effects on knowledge sharing  
 Phase 1: Employee voice and SE 
initiation 
Phase 2: SEWC and transnational 
knowledge sharing 
 
Phase 3: Transnational employee voice, 
knowledge sharing and board relationships 
Headquarter 
country and 
subsidiary 
country level  
 
 
  
 
    
 
 
SEWC level      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board level     
 
 
 
  
  
 KNOWLEDGE SHARING INCREASES 
Strengthening of 
1. Affective & cognitive trust 
+ 2. Motivation to share knowledge 
= 3. Actual knowledge sharing & 
shared participatory culture 
Employee voice unevenly distributed; 
limited transnational knowledge sharing 
National systems incompatible with SE 
framework & each other 
Varying anticipations of SEWC & board 
representation 
Support for transnational 
employee voice increases 
Compatibility between different 
systems of voice improves 
Channels for knowledge sharing 
between nations grow 
Transnational employee voice on 
SEWC 
Vertical channels for knowledge 
sharing grow 
 
Board-SEWC link enhances knowledge 
sharing and cooperation in 
implementing change 
 
Solely headquarter employees 
involved in employee board-level 
representation 
TBLERs become valued ‘sparring 
partners’ of managers 
Influence on decision-making widens 
Europeanization of strategic 
perspective 
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Table 2: Three perspectives over time: Illustrative quotes of selected key themes from findings 
EMPLOYEES  TRADE UNION OFFICIALS MANAGERS 
 
Barriers to multilateral knowledge sharing in Phase 1 employee voice and SE initiation  
Lack of compatibility between different voice systems 
The participation on the board is complicated, most of the 
countries don’t understand the system. […] for international 
colleagues, this is a new experience that is somewhat strange for 
them; it takes a long time for most of them to understand their role. 
(#1)   
When you look at the French, they will strike about every little 
thing, trade unions are very powerful there; we aren’t very familiar 
with that in the Netherlands. (#38) 
 
Lack of compatibility between different voice systems 
 If somebody comes from a country with almost no, or only 
weak, structures for employee voice, [it’s hard] to explain the 
benefits to this person.’ (#42) 
The non-German delegates don’t have a lot of prior knowledge. 
So, we cannot expect that strong employee representatives will 
join the board, but rather that the stronger German 
representatives will be weakened. (#29) 
 
Lack of compatibility between different voice systems 
Initially, the Czech representative [on the SEWC] was only 
concerned about what was happing in his country. The same was 
true for the Romanian, the Polish, the French, the Irish, etc. (#3) 
We supported training courses offered by the trade union 
because we could see how diverse backgrounds of employee 
representatives actually were. (#2) 
Strong influence headquarters; voice unevenly distributed 
We, from the headquarters, always had a relatively good 
relationship with the managers. (#26) 
The people in Germany are close to the headquarters; they had 
more information than we had from the foreign countries … you 
see that people from Germany at the beginning wanted to do it 
themselves. (#30) 
Strong influence headquarters; voice unevenly distributed 
I think it is important that we now do not just consider the 
interests of the German plants, but also consider the interests of 
the international plants. (#21)  
We look at the meetings what is happening in different 
subsidiaries. What was noticeable is that the reporting across 
subsidiaries was very much disorganized. (#29) 
Strong influence headquarters; voice unevenly distributed 
Smaller countries with relatively few employees felt isolated and 
not well integrated. Some of them did not even have their own 
works council. (#13) 
We already had an EWC, but the employee voice was very much 
dominated by the German representatives. And they did not have 
enough consideration for the needs of smaller countries. (#27) 
 
Change mechanisms for overcoming barriers and improving transnational employee voice in Phases 2 and 3 of SE  
Building trust  
We have an interest in keeping potential attacks on managers from 
our people in check. We want positive relations. We have no 
interest in confronting the managers unconstructively. (#26)  
Now, through [transnational] meetings, we [the SEWC] have 
become much closer. We work collectively to achieve a common 
goal, we are united … we have become a small community, and 
friendships have evolved. (#33) 
Building trust  
We can resolve issues now because the people know each other 
and trust each other. (#10) 
For most of the issues that we had to consider, we had to rely on 
a gut feeling, and the legal foundation did not matter very much. 
(#21)  
Building trust 
The advantage is that people [at transnational level] get to know 
each other, not only the management but also the employees. 
They talk to each other … and develop a shared understanding 
of the business. (#4) 
It is important to establish trust. If I [CEO] participate and get 
across the advantages and objectives, I can help the employee 
representatives, because they trust that this is something positive 
for the future of the company. (#13)  
Augmenting of practices for compatibility  
We had to understand the differences between the systems first. 
What is the legal background in Poland, and so on. We put this all 
in a matrix, and we discussed on the SEWC the differences, to 
understand the practices that exist, and how they relate to 
countries. [...] in some instances, we converged some of the 
practices to be better aligned with the SEWC. (#40) 
Augmenting of practices for compatibility  
We organized a seminar for employee board representatives 
outside of Germany, we did study some of the laws and 
regulation, but we also talked a lot about the purpose of it, the 
different role expectations, what can I do and what is not 
allowed. How can we connect the SEWC and the board, and 
how do I wear these different hats for these roles? (#42) 
Augmenting of practices for compatibility  
If the French, let’s say, would try to introduce their style, they 
would upset the other Europeans, who are as a whole very 
constructive. They would not be able to push such an agenda. 
(#36)  
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Augmenting of practices for compatibility (continued) 
For the French, the concept of a social partnership is a different 
world. They had to understand the scope of consultation rights and 
the opportunities resulting from them. (#25) 
 
Augmenting of practices for compatibility (continued) 
We agreed on a template that everyone can use with headings in 
German, English and French, and colleagues all over Europe 
provide information systematically and present it, including the 
economic situation in Europe, in different countries. (#29) 
Augmenting of practices for compatibility (continued) 
In France, there is a strong national interest, and they also like to 
confront us. There was a strong personality on the board who 
focused on national themes. But luckily, we could educate this 
person over time. (#41) 
Sharing success stories  
The French colleagues did not have a work council on the national 
level. We explained this concept to them and then introduced [a 
country-wide work council] in France. By doing so, we brought 
some of the French locations together for the first time. (#40)  
‘In Greece, we had a crisis, and the SEWC was trusted with 
discussing it…’ The outcome was that, ‘even though the revenue 
had halved, no redundancies were made. So we are not just 
focusing on cross-border issues, we also look at specific country 
cases.’ (#35) 
Straddling of roles – Preparation  
We offered a seminar for [TBLERs] outside of Germany, we 
studied laws and regulation; we talked about the purpose of it; 
different role expectations, what can I do; what is not allowed. 
(#42) 
At a seminar for [TBLERs] we studied law and regulation, 
talked about different role expectations, what is allowed or not 
allowed. How can we connect the SEWC and the board; how do 
I wear these different hats? (#44) 
Embracing a European perspective  
We have an opportunity to get a second perspective on issues. 
Local managers may say that in a certain country everything is 
going really well, while employee representatives may say that 
things are not going well … (#22) 
The international employee representatives’ voice was heard 
much more through this process. They are highly engaged and 
now our board is highly internationalized. We’ve had a drastic 
change, with real leadership of employee voice in the company. 
(#27) 
 
Effects of dual-forum transnational employee voice and knowledge sharing actors 
Effective transnational employee voice for knowledge sharing  
We now have contact with other European countries and 
understand better how the MNC operates. We have a strong global 
focus and understand how cross-border strategies are 
implemented. This form of exchange of information is new and 
positive for all sides. The board now receives information from 
[EU] employees first hand. (#26) 
The participation within the EU, has been improved significantly 
[...] the culture is more open, nothing is really a secret anymore, 
e.g., economic data and middle term planning, such as five-year 
investment plans. (#30) 
Effective transnational employee voice for knowledge 
sharing  
Employees working in smaller [transnational] subsidiaries 
receive valuable information first hand, even when they are not 
able to participate directly in the SEWC. (#28) 
Due to the efforts of two employee representatives on the 
SEWC, a culture has been established within the company that 
fosters information flow across the company that goes far 
beyond the legally required information provision. (#15) 
Effective transnational employee voice for knowledge 
sharing  
The number on the board is limited, currently we have German 
and French [TBLERs]; they represent Holland, Sweden, Italy 
and so on […] but they can take the information to the SEWC, 
and we time these two meetings well; about a week after the 
board meeting to allow them to disseminate the information 
about future plans. This is an important multiplier for 
transparency in decisions. (#41) 
Change can only be effectively implemented when there is a 
fundamental agreement between employees and management. 
We can make decisions, but if nobody supports these decisions, 
they are meaningless. (#6)  
Influence in decision-making widens 
We have a very proactive relationship with the headquarters 
managers. We are now working on a strategy for the MNC on the 
board; we have discussed our perspective on it in advance 
extensively in the SEWC. The management is listening to our 
recommendations. (#25)  
Through the SEWC, employees now have a direct link to the top 
management, to the board… In France, there had been a major 
economic problem in a subsidiary because of serious management 
errors … It came out through the works council, and the works 
council could quickly respond to the problems and conflict. (#11) 
Influence in decision-making widens 
We talk about what is happening in the subsidiaries including 
employment, mergers, production planning. We bring together 
information from different subsidiaries, and plan what we need 
to ask the executives. (#29) 
Some SEWCs regularly inform workers in off-shore [beyond-
EU] companies if they are affected by any decisions taken by the 
SE. That includes colleagues in India, Brazil or South Africa. 
(#43) 
Influence in decision-making widens 
The SEWC is now completely involved in all cross-border 
activities ... They have established working groups that take part 
in all the company’s business. (#18) 
We receive information through the SEWC. We want to ensure 
that the interests of the employees are considered, but we also 
want to have information. A lot of information now comes from 
individual countries which we can access through the SEWC. 
(#36) 
 
 
